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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the cost structure of the Swiss urban public transport sec-
tor in order to assess scale and scope economies. A multi-output cost function has 
been estimated for a panel data set of companies operating trolley-bus, motor-bus and 
tramway systems. The results suggest increasing returns to scale and economies of 
scope. This analysis has important policy implications in view of the ongoing reforms 
in several European countries in which competitive tendering is occasionally used to 
assign the provision of transport services to unbundled franchised monopolies. The 
significant scope economies provide some evidence in favor of integrated multi-mode 
operation as opposed to unbundling. 
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1.0 Introduction 
During the last two decades several EU-member countries have introduced a 
competitive tendering procedure in the assignment of franchised monopolies in the 
local transport industry. This process has been initiated by the European Directive 
1191/69/EU (modified by 1893/91/EU) that encourages the member countries to use 
competitive tenders in cases where the providers are not owned by home states. The 
implementation of tendering procedures in the urban transit industry is, however, not 
straightforward, because in many cases the incumbents are large multi-mode transit 
operators that combine different transport systems such as motor-bus, tramway and 
trolley-bus. In such cases companies specialized in a single transit service face a bar-
rier to market entry because of the comparative advantage of the incumbent multi-
mode companies. Therefore, due to fewer potential bidders for the multi-mode transit 
services, the benefits from competitive tendering would not be exploited completely.1  
In order to induce more competition and avoid insufficient number of bids, 
there is a tendency among the public authorities toward opening separate competitive 
tenders for different modes of transport. This kind of ‘unbundling’ has been already 
used in the urban public transport systems in several European countries.2  When 
transport modes are unbundled,3 bidding can be opened to both single-mode operators 
and multi-mode companies. On the other hand, a multi-mode transit company serving 
the entire local market can completely exploit the potential scope and scale economies 
and reduce the planning costs of urban transport, since the local authority must not 
                                                 
1 For a discussion of the problems in the application of competitive tendering processes in the local 
transport sector see Cambini and Filippini (2003). 
2 For instance, in Rome a competitive tendering procedure for some additional lines has been already 
utilized. See Cambini and Boitani (2006) for a discussion of this issue. 
3 By unbundling we refer to legal unbundling (as opposed to ownership unbundling) which means the 
divestiture into more than one company. In principle the resulting companies can belong to a single 
holding firm.  
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coordinate a large set of services provided by different operators in order to have a 
well integrated network. Moreover, such integrated companies potentially provide a 
better quality of service with more stable and coordinated timetables to the extent that 
the disruptions can be minimized by substituting across transport modes.  
The choice between a single tendering procedure for the entire transport ser-
vices and unbundling the modes into separate tenders is a crucial policy question that 
has extremely important impacts on the organization of the local transport system 
namely, the operation mode (single or multiple) in different parts of a network as well 
as the planning of final services such as frequencies, number of lines etc. Therefore, it 
is relevant for the local authorities to know if and to what extent multi-mode suppliers 
could use the scope and scale economies to reduce their costs in comparison to a 
group of single-mode operators. This question is in line with the important issue of 
natural monopoly raised by Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982), applied to the local trans-
port sector.  
In the presence of economies of scope a multi-output firm is more economical 
than separate specialized firms. Following Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) and Bailey 
and Friedlaender (1982) the scope economies can result from sharing or the joint 
utilization of inputs. In the case of local public transportation such sharable inputs are 
labor, capital and energy. Local public transport companies which combine several 
transport modes use similar equipment such as wires, overhead line and similar skills 
such as driving, management and network maintenance. Such synergies also apply to 
activities like advertising, scheduling and ticketing. Another source of cost savings is 
due to economies of massed reserves (Waldman and Jensen, 2001). Multi-output 
transportation companies can make use of the same reserve capacity for maintenance 
and buildings.  
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The purpose of this study is to make a contribution to the above debate on the 
introduction of competitive tendering procedures in the urban bus transportation sec-
tor. This paper explores the empirical evidence of scale and scope economies in 16 
multi-mode transport companies operating in Switzerland from 1985 to 2003. A nor-
malized total cost function with quadratic form has been estimated. The results sug-
gest that scope economies exist for at most of the output levels observed in the data. 
This study provides some evidence in favor of the status quo regarding multi-mode 
transport companies. The potential competition benefits of unbundling remain to be 
explored. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the relevant literature and presents the adopted specification. The concepts of scope 
and scale economies are defined in section 3. The data are described in section 4. Sec-
tion 5 presents the estimation results and discusses their implications. The main con-
clusions are summarized at the end.  
2.0 Model specification and econometric methods 
There is a great body of literature on the cost structure of single output bus 
companies. Filippini and Prioni (1994), Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. (2004a) and Shaw-
Er, Chiang et al. (2005) are among the recent empirical examples. However, only a 
few studies have addressed the issue of scope economies in urban transit systems. Au-
thors such as Gillen and Oum (1984) studied companies operating with a single trans-
port mode but in a multi-product set-up. In these cases the multiple outputs are de-
fined on the basis of service type namely, urban, intercity etc. Previous studies on the 
economies of scope across different modes of transport (such as motor-bus, tramway, 
and trolley-bus) are rare and mostly outdated. The most relevant ones in this category 
are Viton (1992), Viton (1993) and Colburn and Talley (1992), both of which ana-
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lyzed the long run cost structure of urban multi-mode transit system in the U.S. 
Viton (1992) studied the cost structure of a sample of 289 urban transit com-
panies operating in the U.S. between 1984 and 1986. Six modes are distinguished: 
motor-bus, rapid-rail, streetcar, trolley-bus, demand responsive mode and a last mode 
including all other modes. Viton uses a quadratic total cost function with the follow-
ing explanatory variables: six outputs, measured in vehicles-miles, price of labor and 
the average speed in each one of the six modes. Empirical results highlight the pres-
ence of economies of scale and scope. However, the extent of the economies of scope 
depends on the post-consolidation level of the wage: If wages remain unchanged after 
consolidation, economies of scope exist for certain transportation modes. If, on the 
other hand, wages rise due to consolidation, economies of scope are smaller or even 
negative. Colburn and Talley (1992) analyze the economies of scale and scope of a 
single urban multi-service company using quarterly data from 1979 to 1988. Four 
modes are distinguished: motor-bus, dial-a-ride, elderly service, and van pool service. 
Colburn and Talley used a translog total cost function with the following explanatory 
variables: four outputs, measured in vehicles-miles, and three factor prices (labor, fuel 
and capital). The empirical results reported in that study indicate unexploited scale 
economies. However, the evidence of cost complementarity is limited to certain com-
binations involving motor-bus and the three para-transit services (elderly service, and 
van pool service). 
In this paper we consider three modes that are typically used in most European 
urban transit systems namely, motor-bus, trolley-bus and tramway. We will employ a 
panel data econometric approach. To our knowledge this paper is the first empirical 
study of a European urban transit system that provides evidence about the economies 
of scale and scope across transport modes. 
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The model specification is based on a cost function with three outputs namely, 
transport services in three modes and two inputs, labor and capital. The model also 
includes a measure of network size and a time trend. If it is assumed that the firm 
minimizes cost and that the technology is convex, a total cost function can be written 
as:  
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2)( , , , , , ,C C y y y w w n t= )
                                                
, (1) 
where C represents total costs; y(1), y(2) and y(3) are the numbers of seat-kilometers 
provided by trolley-bus, motor-bus and tramway systems respectively; and w(1) and 
w(2) are the factor prices for labor and capital respectively.  
The network size (n) is measured by the number of stops4 and t is the linear 
trend which captures the shift in technology representing technical change.  
Following Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) and Mayo (1984) we use a quadratic 
cost function.5 Unlike logarithmic forms, this functional form accommodates zero 
values for outputs thus, allows a straightforward identification of scope economies. 
Although logarithmic functions could be used with an arbitrary small value transfor-
mation for zero values, it has been shown that this approach could result in large er-
rors in the estimation of scope economies (Pulley and Humphrey, 1993). As in our 
case, many output values for trolley-buses and tramways are zero, such estimation 
errors may lead to misleading conclusions about scope economies. However, one dis-
advantage of the quadratic form is that the linear homogeneity of the cost function in 
input prices cannot be imposed by parametric restrictions without sacrificing the 
flexibility of the functional form (Caves, Christensen et al., 1980).  
 
4 In two alternative specifications we respectively used area size and network length (sum of the three 
modes) instead of number of stops. Neither variable has shown any statistically significant effect at 5 
per cent significance level. This can be partly explained by relatively high density variation within a 
service area and also variation of shape and complexity across different networks.  
5 A quadratic function requires an approximation of the underlying cost function at a local point, which 
in our case is taken at the sample mean. Thus, all independent variables are normalized by their sample 
mean values.  
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The quadratic cost function specification can therefore be written as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
1
2
M M M P
m m mn m n p p n t
it it it it it it t it
m m n p
C y y y w n tα α α β α α= + + + + + +∑ ∑∑ ∑ ε , (2) 
where superscripts m and p denote respectively, the number of products (1, 2, 3) and 
the number of input factors (1, 2), subscripts i and t denote respectively company and 
year. Variable y is a product quantity, w a factor price, t a time trend and n is a net-
work characteristic. The factor prices and the network variable are introduced in a lin-
ear way (following Mayo (1984) and Viton (1992), respectively).  
The linear homogeneity in input prices can be imposed by normalization of 
prices namely, by dividing the costs and all factor prices by one common factor price 
(see Featherstone and Moss (1994) and Jara-Diaz, Martinez-Budria et al. (2003)).  
The normalized quadratic cost function takes the following form: 
1
' ( ) ( ) ( ) '( )
0
1
2
M M M P
m m mn m n p p n t
it it it it it it t it
m m n p
C y y y w n tα α α β α α−= + + + + + +∑ ∑∑ ∑ ε , (3) 
where  is the normalized cost and 'itC
'( )p
itw  is the normalized input prices. In this case, 
given that the model does not have any second-order term for input prices, the linear 
homogeneity restriction is equivalent to excluding one price coefficient.  
The econometric model (3) is estimated for an unbalanced panel data set con-
sisting of 16 companies over 19 years (300 observations).6 The repeated observations 
of a same company allow the use of panel data models that can account for unob-
served heterogeneity across companies. However, as the number of companies is 
smaller than the number of periods (N<T), this data set is an unusual case for widely 
used panel data specifications such as fixed effects and random effects models, in 
                                                 
6 We have also estimated the model without linear homogeneity restriction (as in Equation 2). The re-
sults (available upon request) are more or less similar to those of the normalized model. However, the 
statistical significance for scope and scale economies is slightly different across the two models with 
the normalized model having generally more significant values.  
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which T is small relative to N.7 When sample period is relatively short, one can as-
sume that the individual effects remain constant. In long panel data on the other hand 
these effects might change over time, resulting in serial correlation of errors.8 Both 
fixed and random effects models can be extended to include serial correlations with 
an autoregressive model of order 1 as in Cochrane-Orcutt approach (Cochrane and 
Orcutt, 1949). However, in fixed/random effects models a great part of the between 
variations (variations among companies) can be suppressed into the firm-specific ef-
fects. Given the small size of the sample and the relative importance of between varia-
tions in identifying the scope and scale economies, a pooled model seems to be ade-
quate for our study.  
Therefore, we decided to use a heteroscedastic model with autoregressive er-
rors, as proposed by Kmenta (1986).9 The Kmenta approach, also known as the cross-
sectionally heteroscedastic and time-wise autoregressive model, is attractive when N, 
the number of units, is lower than T, the number of periods, or when the within varia-
tion of many explanatory variables is low. In this model, the cross-sectional hetero-
scedasticity captures the unobserved heterogeneity across companies,10 while the se-
rial correlation is modeled through the autoregressive error structure as follows: 
uittiiit += −1,ερε  (autoregressive errors) (4) 
E( )=2itu
2
i
σ  (heteroscedasticity) (5) 
                                                 
7 For a detailed presentation of panel data models, see Greene (2003) and Baltagi (2001).  
8 The significant test statistics from autocorrelation test in panel data (Wooldridge, 2002) indicates the 
presence of serial correlation in the data.  
9 The model has been also estimated using the fixed and random effects approaches. The results (avail-
able upon request) show that the estimated coefficients are generally similar to those reported in the 
paper. However, in the fixed effects model the coefficient of the network size variable is negative. This 
counterintuitive result could be due to extremely low within variation of that variable.  
10 A modified Wald test on an OLS model shows the existence of heteroscedasticity in our data.  
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where iρ  is a coefficient of first-order autocorrelation. It is assumed that the correla-
tion parameter varies across the firms. Therefore, the unobserved heterogeneity across 
firms is accounted by firm-specific variances and serial correlation coefficients. The 
Kmenta method consists of two sequential feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
transformations to remove autocorrelation and cross-sectional heteroscedasticity re-
spectively (Baltagi, 2001; Kmenta, 1986). 
3.0 Scale and scope economies 
Following Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) global economies of scale 11  in a 
multi-output setting are defined as: 
( )
( )
( )
*
M
m
m
m
C ySL
Cy
y
= ∂
∂∑
, (6) 
where y=(y(1), y(2), y(3)) for m=1 (trolley-bus), 2 (motor-bus) and 3 (tramway). Global 
economies of scale describe the cost behavior due to proportional changes in the en-
tire production.  
In addition, product-specific economies of scale are based on changes of one 
output or an output pair, while all other outputs are held constant. Product-specific 
economies of scale to the product m are defined as: 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
*
m
m
m
m
C y C ySL Cy
y
−−= ∂
∂
, (7) 
                                                 
11 In the definition of economies of scale we do not follow Caves, Christensen et al. (1984) by distin-
guishing between economies of scale and economies of density due to the complexity of the weighting 
of different network elements.  
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where ( )( ) ( )mC y C y −−  represents the incremental cost resulting from output m and 
( )( mC y − )  is the costs of producing all the outputs jointly except output m. 
Similarly, in the case of joint production of outputs m and n the product-
specific economies of scale can be written as:  
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
mn
mn
m n
m n
C y C ySL Cy y
y y
−−= C∂ ∂+∂ ∂
, (8) 
where ( )( mnC y − )  is the costs of producing all the outputs except outputs m and n.  
All the above definitions represent the ratio of the expansion rate in all or cer-
tain output(s) to the rate of the resulting increase in costs. For any one of these cases 
(global, output m, or output pair m and n) the returns to scale are increasing, constant 
or decreasing if the corresponding ratio (SL, SLm or SLmn) is greater, equal or less than 
one.  
Economies of scope are present when costs can be reduced by joint production 
of multiple outputs. Following Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) the degree of global 
economies of scope in the production of three products is defined as the ratio of 
excess costs of separate production to the costs of joint production of all outputs:  
(1) (2) (3)( ,0,0) (0, ,0) (0,0, ) ( )
( )
C y C y C y C ySC
C y
+ + −= . (9) 
A positive (negative) value for the above expression implies the existence of 
global economies (diseconomies) of scope. 
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In addition to the above measure, product-specific measures can be defined for 
any given output or output pair. The product-specific economies of scope for output m 
(SCm) measure the relative increase in costs resulting from separating the production 
of output m from all other outputs: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) (
( )
m m
m
C y C y C ySC
C y
−+ −= ) . (10) 
In line with Fraquelli, Piacenza et al. (2004b) the degree of product-specific 
economies of scope for output pair m and n with the remaining output being zero, is 
defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ,
( , )
m n m
mn m n
C y C y C y ySC
C y y
+ −= )
n
                                                
. (11) 
Product-specific economies (diseconomies) of scope exist if SCm or SCmn is 
greater (smaller) than zero. 
4.0 Data 
The sample consists of sixteen public transport companies, which cover all the 
local public transit services within the urban centers in Switzerland.12 Most of these 
companies participate in a transport association that ensures coordination with the re-
gional public transport system.13 There is no overlap between the offered transport 
services across companies. Therefore, all these companies can be considered as inde-
pendent local monopolies.  
 
12 Swiss Federal Statistical Office classifies local public transport into urban and rural categories (BFS, 
1985-97). The sample used in this paper excludes rural transport companies. These companies are gen-
erally bus operators that cover relatively long distances with low frequencies in rural areas, which is 
considered as a different transport operation compared to urban transport.  
13 These associations are created for setting the prices and organizing the ticketing. They also ensure 
that passengers can use a single time-table and travel throughout the entire associated network with 
only one ticket. However, the participating companies operate independently. 
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For the years between 1985 through 1997 the data have been extracted from 
the annual statistics on public transport reported by the Swiss Federal Statistical Of-
fice (BFS, 1985-97). The data for the following years (1998–2003) have been col-
lected from companies’ annual reports.14 Because of a merger with a regional trans-
portation company in 1999, one company was excluded from the sample after the 
merger. The available information in the dataset includes costs, total number of em-
ployees, network length, total numbers of trolley-buses, motor-buses and tramways, 
vehicle-kilometers, delivered passengers and total number of seats in each transporta-
tion mode.  
The variables for the cost function specification were calculated as follows. 
Total costs (TC) are calculated as the total expenditures of the local public transit 
firms in a given year. The output y is measured by the number of seat-kilometers pro-
vided by motor-buses, trolley-buses and tramways, respectively. This is a pure supply 
output measure that has been used in previous studies for bus companies, such as 
Fazioli, Filippini et al. (1993), Farsi, Filippini et al. (2006). Filippini and Prioni (2003) 
compared a model with bus-kilometers with one with seat-kilometers as output. The 
bus-kilometer output variable has the disadvantage that the size of the bus is not taken 
into account. Alternatively some authors have used passenger revenue (as in Button 
and O'Donnell, 1985) or passenger trips (Berechman, 1987; Bhattacharyya, Kumb-
hakar et al., 1995; Windle, 1988). 
Labor price (w1) is defined as the ratio of annual labor costs to the total num-
ber of full-time equivalent employees. The largest fraction of total costs is for labor 
costs (61 per cent on average). Following Friedlaender and Chiang (1983), the capital 
price (w2) is calculated as residual cost (where residual cost is total cost minus labor) 
                                                 
14 The Federal Statistical Office does not provide data on individual companies after 1997. 
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divided by the total number of seats in the operator’s fleet.15 Capital price is therefore 
a measure of all non-labor inputs including materials and energy input.16  Unfortu-
nately no data were available which would allow us to calculate the capital stock us-
ing the capital inventory method. The use of a simple indicator for capital stock can 
be justified by the fact that the bus companies do not possess a significant stock of 
capital apart from the rolling stock.  
Table 1 provides the sample’s descriptive statistics. All the costs and prices 
are adjusted for inflation using consumer price index and are measured in year 2000 
Swiss Francs (CHF). As can be seen in the table, the sample shows a considerable 
variation in all three outputs. All the companies in the sample provide motor-bus 
transport. As there were only seven companies (out of 16) with non-zero tramway 
services, we see from the table that the median output of the tramways is zero.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (300 observations) 
 
 Min. 1st Quartile Median Mean 
3rd Quar-
tile Max. Std. dev. 
Trolley-bus 0 79 176 249 368 861 212 
Motor-bus 32 93 181 334 343 1’614 401 
Output 
[Mio seat-
kilometers] Tramway 0 0 0 365 335 2’926 745 
Total cost [CHF] 8.2·106 18.2·106 31.0·106 79.3·106 108.9·106 430.4·106 97.9·106
Labor price [CHF per em-
ployee] 39’888 85’585 93’330 90’942 99’321 123’861 12’317 
Capital price [CHF per 
100 seats] 49’128 111’706 135’654 141’276 161’151 312’774 41’034 
Number of stops 64 141 186 246 278 772 163 
Among the sixteen companies in the sample, six offer all three modal transit 
services; nine provide motor-bus and trolley-bus services; and one firm offers motor-
                                                 
15 For an application of this approach in the bus industry see Filippini and Prioni (2003) and Farsi, 
Filippini et al. (2006). 
16 The energy price is not included directly because energy costs are only a small fraction of total costs 
(3.4 per cent on average and less than 6.3 per cent for 95 per cent of observation) and also because it 
does not vary much over time.  
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bus and tramway services. All the companies in the sample except one are multi-
output operators.17 Therefore the single-output cases can be considered as exceptions 
in Switzerland’s urban transit system. This issue might create problems in estimating 
some of the product-specific scale and scope economies, which are based on extrapo-
lation of costs for specific output combinations with zero values. However, this 
should be considered in view of the fact that these cost values are second-order ap-
proximations at boundary points. These points being far from the sample mean might 
incur relatively high approximation errors in any case. 
Moreover, a careful analysis of the sample shows that a considerable number 
of the companies are highly specialized in a single transport mode. For instance, there 
exist four two-output companies (about a quarter of the entire sample) whose motor-
bus or tramway output consists of more than 80 percent of their total output in terms 
of seat-kilometers. Therefore, the estimated scale and scope economies can be rea-
sonably extended to such cases provided that the single-output and multi-output op-
erators use a more or less similar production technology.  
For the estimation of product-specific scope and scale economies we will fo-
cus on output combinations that are realistic in comparison to the observed cases in 
the sample. Therefore, we exclude the single-output case with trolley-bus and the two-
output case with motor-bus/tram combination, because there is no case with strong 
specialization that can be considered closely similar to these two cases.  
5.0 Results 
The estimation results are given in Table 2. As expected, the first order output 
coefficients ( 1α , 2α  and 3α ) and that of the input price ( 2β ) are positive and highly 
                                                 
17 The exception is a bus company that has taken all its trolley-buses out of service in the last three 
years of the sample period.  
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significant. The first-order coefficients suggest that tramway system has the highest 
marginal cost followed by trolley-bus and motor-bus. This order can be explained by 
the relatively high costs of tramway and trolley-bus systems that require an electricity 
grid and an additional railway network in the case of tramway. Both these elements 
have relatively high capital and labor costs that accrue the corresponding marginal 
costs. The quadratic output coefficients terms ( 11α , 22α  and 33α ) are negative (except 
11α  which is statistically insignificant), suggesting that the marginal cost of any given 
output is decreasing in that output.  
As labor price is used for normalization, the coefficient 1β  is excluded from 
the normalized quadratic cost function. As expected, the sign of the coefficient nα  is 
positive, showing that a higher number of stops increase costs. The negative coeffi-
cient tα  show that companies have reduced their operating costs in the sample time 
period. The autocorrelation coefficient has also been estimated for all companies. The 
considerable variation of these values confirms the assumption that the correlation 
structure varies across firms. These coefficients are greater than .7 for half of the 
companies, suggesting the importance of serial correlation in our sample.18  
 
                                                 
18 The estimated correlation coefficients range from .03 to .99 with an average value of .64 and with a 
value greater than .5 for 12 companies.  
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Table 2: Regression results 
Parameter Estimate  Parameter Estimate 
0α  
(Constant) 
922’873.8*** 
(31’080.1)  
12α  0.0011 (0.5685) 
1α  
(Trolley-
bus) 
841.0*** 
(90.1)  
13α  -0.3974* (0.2352) 
2α  
(Motor-
bus) 
775.6*** 
(75.1)  
23α  0.3594*** (0.1052) 
3α  
(Tramway) 
898.2*** 
(65.3)  
2β  
(Capital) 
57’657.6***
(8’735.9) 
11α  0.2888 (0.4404)  
nα  
Number of 
(stops) 
775.2*** 
(154.8) 
22α  -0.5466** (0.2524)  
tα  
(Time trend) 
-6’692.2***
(1’404.3) 
33α  -0.2936** (0.1167)  iρ  (median)(corr. coeff.) 
0.71 
 
 
***, ** and * refer to 1, 5 and 10 per cent level of significance respectively.  
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The measurement units are the same as those used in Table 1.  
 
The results presented in Table 2 can be used to estimate the economies of 
scale and scope.  
In order to study the variation of scale and scope economies in the sample, we 
considered several representative sample points regarding outputs. In particular, we 
estimated the scale economies respectively for output values at the sample mean, me-
dian, 1st and 3rd quartiles of non-zero output values. For all non-output variables that 
enter in the equations, we considered the sample mean values. For instance, the me-
dian point consists of the medians of outputs after excluding the zero values with all 
other variables kept at their mean values. As discussed in the data section, for the 
product-specific economies, only the realistic output combinations are estimated. 
Namely, the single-output trolley bus and the two-output tram/motor-bus are excluded. 
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Table 3 shows the point estimates of scale economies along with their standard 
errors. The estimated global scale economies are significantly greater than one, sug-
gesting increasing returns to scale at all the considered output levels. This implies that 
the scale economies are not fully exploited in a great majority of the companies. The 
results also indicate that most of the estimated product-specific coefficients are sig-
nificantly different from one. Only for a joint production of trolley-bus and motor-bus 
the hypothesis of constant product-specific returns to scale cannot be rejected.  
 
Table 3: Estimates of the economies of scale 
Output SL (global) 
SL2 
(motor-bus) 
SL3 
(tramway) 
SL12 
(trolley/ 
motor-bus) 
SL13 
(trolley/ 
tram) 
1st 
Quartile 
1.29*** 
(0.09) 
1.03** 
(0.01) 
1.03***
(0.01) 
1.01 
(0.03) 
1.05***
(0.02) 
Median 1.19*** (0.05) 
1.06** 
(0.02) 
1.06***
(0.02) 
1.01 
(0.07) 
1.09** 
(0.04) 
Mean 1.16*** (0.04) 
1.12** 
(0.05) 
1.06***
(0.02) 
1.05 
(0.09) 
1.09** 
(0.04) 
3rd 
Quartile 
1.36*** 
(0.11) 
1.08** 
(0.03) 
1.43* 
(0.23) 
1.02 
(0.12) 
1.58** 
(0.26) 
 
The estimates labeled with asterisks are significantly greater than 1, with ***, ** and * referring to 1, 5 
and 10 per cent level of significance, respectively.  
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 shows the point estimates for economies of scope. Similar to the pre-
vious table, only the realistic output combinations are included. Most of the numbers 
in Table 4 are significantly greater than zero, indicating scope economies at all output 
levels and across all three output types. For instance the global scope economies of 
0.25 at the sample median means that at the median output levels total costs are on 
average 25 percent lower when offering all the three outputs by one company than 
produced by three specialized firms. In general economies of scope are decreasing 
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with an increase in outputs. The computed values are statistically different from zero 
at the 1st quartile and median output levels as well as some of the mean output levels.  
While global scope economies remain significant for all output levels, the 
product-specific economies of scope seem to be exhausted after a certain level of out-
put, as indicated by mostly insignificant values at the 3rd quartile output level. The 
product-specific economies of scope in the single-output case, that is when one output 
is produced by a company and the other two by another company, are in a similar 
range for both tram and motor-bus at the 1st quartile and median output levels (9 – 13 
per cent for median and 19 – 21 per cent for 1st quartile). The joint production of trol-
ley-bus and tramway also yields economies of scope. Even higher are the cost savings 
from a joint production of trolley-bus und motor-bus (37 per cent at the 1st quartile 
output level).  
 
Table 4: Estimates of the economies of scope 
Output SC (global) 
SC2 
(motor-
bus) 
SC3 
(tram) 
SC12 
(trolley/ 
motor-bus) 
SC13 
(trolley/ 
tram) 
1. Quar-
tile 
0.41*** 
(0.12) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.21***
(0.06) 
0.37***
(0.09) 
0.27***
(0.07) 
Median 0.25*** (0.07) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.13***
(0.05) 
0.21***
(0.06) 
0.21***
(0.07) 
Mean 0.19*** (0.06) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.21***
(0.07) 
3. Quar-
tile 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.23* 
(0.12) 
 
***, ** and * refer to 1, 5 and 10 per cent level of significance, respectively.  
Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
It should be noted that the value of the global economies of scale depends 
upon both product specific economies of scale and economies of scope. The results 
listed in Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that the global scale economies are driven by 
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strong economies of scope and to a lower extent by product-specific economies of 
scale. As pointed out by Baumol, Panzar et al. (1982) decreasing average incremental 
costs of each product along with global scope economies imply subadditivity in costs. 
Therefore, the results of this paper provide suggestive evidence that the industry can 
be characterized as a natural monopoly.  
6.0 Discussion 
Several European countries have introduced a competitive tendering procedure 
in the assignment of franchised monopoly in the local transport industry. In the case 
of multi-mode systems the regulator has to decide to open the competitive tendering 
procedure for supplying the entire transport services or to unbundle the multi-mode 
systems and open separate tenders for different modes of transport. In order to make 
the decision the regulator should have information on the economies of scope. Few 
studies have addressed the issue of scope economies in local transport systems.  
The goal of this paper is to make a contribution to the ongoing debate about 
tendering local transport services. It is argued that the unbundling of transport modes 
in competitive tendering brings about efficiency benefits since the level of potential 
bidders is high and thus competition is more intense. On the other hand, integrated 
companies benefit from the potential scope economies and reduce the total cost of 
service planning, since the local authority has not to integrate the entire range of ser-
vices provided by the different operators. Of course, in this case the potential number 
of bidders would be relatively low, since it is difficult for a small operator to provide 
services in a big city. Therefore, the potential benefits from competition for the mar-
ket would be lower. 
The tradeoff between these two efficiency gains lies at the core of the policy 
debate about unbundling. Using an empirical analysis of the cost structure of the ur-
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ban transit companies in Switzerland this paper provides an assessment of scope and 
scale economies that would be compromised as a result of unbundling. The consid-
ered transport modes are motor-bus, trolley-bus and tramway systems. 
The estimation results indicate considerable economies of scope, suggesting 
that unbundling a multi-mode company into single-output companies might lead to 
higher costs as the synergies in the joint production can no longer be exploited. More-
over, the results indicate increasing returns to scale in almost all outputs which com-
bined with cost complementarity, can be considered as a suggestive evidence for natu-
ral monopoly.  
The results of this study provide some insight to the efficiency trade-off of un-
bundling between the loss of economies of scope and the gain of higher cost effi-
ciency from the introduction of competition for market entry. The assessment of the 
efficiency gains of unbundling through greater competition remains an open question 
that needs further research. In particular, it is not clear that the unbundling can be ef-
fective in lowering barriers to market entry for some of the transport modes such as 
tramways that require relatively high infrastructure costs.  
An alternative to competitive tendering procedures for the multi-mode trans-
port system could be the introduction of incentive regulation schemes such as ‘yard-
stick competition’ in which cost-efficiency is induced by controlling each local mo-
nopolist based on average costs of similar firms (Shleifer, 1985). The advantage of 
such regulatory instruments is that they allow a complete exploitation of the econo-
mies of scale and scope while avoiding the implementation problems related to com-
petitive tendering policies for urban transit systems.  
Finally, it should be noted that unbundling might also have undesired conse-
quences for quality of service. Namely, the integrated multi-mode operators have a 
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better flexibility in minimizing the disruptions and lower the instability of their time-
tables by reallocating across different modes. Moreover, with lower transaction costs 
related to information and communication, such companies have a greater possibility 
in creating trust among the consumers, thus reaching higher levels of quality as per-
ceived by the society.  
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